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Sotomayor’s Supreme Court Race Jurisprudence: 
“Fidelity to the Law” 
Tanya Katerí Hernández  
During the Senate confirmation hearings for Justice Sonia Sotomayor, concerns 
were persistently raised about her ability to be impartial. In this Essay, Professor 
Hernández argues that the Supreme Court’s race-related jurisprudence illuminates 
Justice Sotomayor’s continued commitment to her stated judicial philosophy of “fidelity 
to the law.” The record suggests that Justice Sotomayor has not sought to unilaterally 
impose her own personal racial policy preferences, but has instead worked as a team 
player to scrupulously apply legal precedents, rules of standing, and congressional 
intent.  
 
During the Senate confirmation hearings for Justice Sonia Sotomayor, 
concerns were persistently raised about her ability to be impartial given her 
statement, in a 2001 speech entitled “A Latina Judge’s Voice,” that she “would 
hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would 
more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t 
lived that life.”1 In response, conservative pundit Rush Limbaugh and many 
others railed against her nomination, “proclaiming on talk radio broadcasts 
from coast-to-coast that she is a ‘reverse-racist’ and nothing less than ‘anti-
white.’”2 Yet, when asked at the Senate confirmation hearings about her 
judicial philosophy, Justice Sotomayor succinctly stated that it is “[s]imple: 
fidelity to the law.”3 The occasion of Justice Sotomayor’s fifth anniversary on 
the Court provides us with an opportune moment to assess the early concern 
that she would be an inappropriate judicial activist, particularly with respect to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002). 
2. Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on the Nomination and Confirmation of the First Latina Justice on 
the U.S. Supreme Court: The Assimilation Demand At Work, 30 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O L. REV. 
97, 135 (2011). 
3. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 59 (2009), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg56940/html/CHRG 
-111shrg56940.htm (statement of Sonia Sotomayor, J.). 
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race-related legal issues.4 A review of the record demonstrates Justice 
Sotomayor’s continued commitment to her judicial philosophy of “fidelity to 
the law,” which had also been her hallmark as a Second Circuit judge and 
district court judge.5 Indeed, before Justice Sotomayor was appointed to the 
Supreme Court, a Congressional Research Service analysis of her opinions as a 
federal judge concluded: 
[T]he most consistent characteristic of Judge Sotomayor’s approach as 
an appellate judge has been an adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis 
. . . . Other characteristics appear to include what many would describe 
as a careful application of particular facts at issue in a case and a dislike 
for situations in which the court might be seen as overstepping its 
judicial role.6 
Similarly, U.S. Law Week’s assessment of Judge Sotomayor’s federal court 
opinions concluded, “Sotomayor’s opinions steer a middle-of-the-road course 
in many instances, citing judicial precedent and doctrine in ways that tend to 
negate charges of judicial activism.”7  
In fact, in nine of the ten Supreme Court cases that I have identified and 
discuss herein as centrally implicating an aspect of racial justice, Justice 
Sotomayor has not been the principal author of either the majority opinion, a 
concurrence, or a dissenting opinion. The ten cases include three employment 
discrimination cases, two voting rights cases, an affirmative action case, two 
Batson juror challenges, one death penalty case, and one criminal trial error 
petition for certiorari. Justice Sotomayor’s approximately ten percent lead 
authorship rate for majority or dissenting opinions in racial justice cases 
essentially parallels her lead authorship rate on majority or dissenting opinions 
generally.8 Moreover, Justice Sotomayor’s authorship rate also aligns with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 135 (detailing the campaign against Justice Sotomayor for being 
anti-white and a racial extremist). 
5. See ANNA C. HENNING & KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., JUDGE SONIA 
SOTOMAYOR: ANALYSIS OF SELECTED OPINIONS ii (June 19, 2009).  
6. Id. 
7. Broad Judicial Role, but Also Restraint Show Up in Nominee Sotomayor’s Opinions, 77 
U.S.L.WK. 2715 (May 26, 2009). 
8. For overall statistics on opinion authorship, see Erin Miller et al., SCOTUSblog FINAL Stats 
OT09, SCOTUSBLOG 5 (July 7, 2010), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads 
/2010/07/Final-Stats-OT09-0707101.pdf; Stat Pack for October Term 2010, SCOTUSBLOG 6 
(June 28, 2011), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SB_OT10 
_stat_pack_final.pdf; Stat Pack for October Term 2011, SCOTUSBLOG 5, 7 (Sept. 25, 2012), 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2417329 
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general authorship rate of all the other Justices.9 It is true that the Chief Justice 
(or the most senior Justice voting in the majority) follows an informal protocol 
for selecting which Justice will author the majority opinion, doing so in 
consultation with the other Justices in ways that seek to balance the workload 
among all nine Justices.10 Yet any Supreme Court Justice with a distinctive 
perspective can file either a concurring opinion or dissenting opinion.11 In five 
years on the Court, Justice Sotomayor has largely refrained from authoring 
concurring or dissenting opinions in racial justice cases. In other words, this 
fifth year anniversary finds Justice Sotomayor in the role of “team player” 
rather than racial maverick in each of the race cases in which she has voted. I 
use the term “team player” not only to emphasize how often Justice Sotomayor 
has chosen to join the opinions of her fellow Justices rather than strike out on 
her own with a separate concurrence or dissent, but also to describe how the 
issues she has raised during oral argument have frequently been incorporated 
by her fellow Justices as valuable contributions to the analysis of racial justice 
issues. Thus, her active role in questioning lawyers during oral arguments, 
which became apparent early in her tenure on the Court, cannot be equated 
with being an “activist” judge.12 A close review of the case decisions and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack 
_OT11_Updated1.pdf. 
9. From 2009 to 2013, each Justice on the current Supreme Court has acted as the principal 
author of between nine and twelve percent of the majority opinions (with a further nine 
percent per curiam and with the exception of Justice Kagan, who joined the Court later than 
all the other Justices). Justice Scalia is the leader in authoring dissenting opinions, with 
seventeen percent of the total dissents, while Justice Sotomayor has only authored ten 
percent of the dissents and Justice Kennedy has authored five percent. See sources cited 
supra note 8.  
10. Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1729, 1746-48 (2006). 
11. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 101 (2011).  
12. A 2009 National Law Journal tally showed that Justice Sotomayor asked more questions 
during a two-week cycle of oral arguments than Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito at 
comparable periods in their first terms. Tony Mauro, No Quiet Time for New Justice, NAT’L 
L.J. (Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202435464482. Since that 
time, Justice Sotomayor has been among the top three questioners during oral argument but 
is often outpaced by the number of questions that Justice Scalia asks. Oral Argument, Stat 
Pack October Term 2010, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2011), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp	  
-content/uploads/2011/06/SB_oral_arguments_OT10_final.pdf (showing that during 
October Term 2010, Justice Sotomayor was the third-most-active questioner after Justices 
Scalia and Breyer); Oral Argument, Stat Pack October Term 2011, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 
2012), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/SB_oral_arguments 
_OT11 _final.pdf (showing that during October Term 2011, Justice Sotomayor was the 
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kinds of questions that Justice Sotomayor posed makes evident her “fidelity to 
the law” inasmuch as she has not sought the unilateral imposition of her own 
personal racial policy preferences but has instead worked as a team player to 
scrupulously apply legal precedents, rules of standing, and congressional 
intent. 
i .  sotomayor joining  in  majority and per curiam opinions 
In Lewis v. City of Chicago,13 the City of Chicago administered a 1995 written 
exam to applicants seeking to work in the Chicago Fire Department. Those 
who scored between 89-100 were “well-qualified,” and these candidates would 
proceed to the next exam, which included a physical-abilities test, background 
check, medical exam, and drug test.14 Those who scored below the “well-
qualified” benchmark (below 65) were notified of the failing score and would 
not be considered for a firefighter position.15 The scorers between 65-88 were 
“qualified,” but based on the City’s hiring needs and the number of “well-
qualified” applicants, these applicants were not likely to be called for the 
second exam.16 In 1997, an African American applicant who scored in the 
“qualified” range was not allowed to proceed to the subsequent evaluations.17 
Along with five other applicants, he filed a racial discrimination charge with 
the EEOC.18 Soon, the district court certified a class of more than 6,000 African 
Americans who also alleged that the 1995 scoring practice was an unlawful 
employment practice.19 The plaintiffs prevailed in district court, but the 
Seventh Circuit held that petitioners’ suit was untimely since “the earliest 
EEOC charge was filed more than 300 days after the only discriminatory act: 
sorting the scores into the ‘well-qualified,’ ‘qualified,’ and ‘not-qualified’ 
categories.”20  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
second-most-active questioner after Justice Scalia); Oral Argument, Stat Pack October Term 
2012, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2013), http://scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06 
/argument-justices_OT12.pdf (showing that during October Term 2012, Justice Sotomayor 
was the most active questioner). 
13. 560 U.S. 205 (2010). 
14. Id. at 208. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 208-09. 
17. Id. at 209. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 210 (quoting Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
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Justice Sotomayor joined the majority in reversing the court of appeals’ 
judgment. The Court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit’s stance on a line of 
cases asserting that present effects of prior actions could not lead to Title VII 
liability.21 Instead, the Court held that those cases only established that a Title 
VII plaintiff must show a “present violation” of deliberate discrimination 
within the limitations period. For disparate impact claims such as the one 
presented by the African American applicants, the Court held that no such 
demonstration was necessary; it was permissible to file a claim within the 
prescribed statute of limitations period, counting from the later point in time 
when the employer actually made hiring decisions based on how the test scores 
were sorted.  
During oral argument, Justice Sotomayor’s primary inquiry in her 
questioning was statutory clarification. Her questions were not provocative, 
nor were they grounded in any racial commentary. She probed Title VII and 
sought to reach a conclusion consistent with existing precedent. Specifically, 
during oral argument Justice Sotomayor expressed concern over the language 
of section 703 in Title VII. She asked counsel for the petitioner for clarification 
as to what constitutes a “violation” under the statute and when the Title VII 
violation occurred.22 
During the respondent’s argument, Sotomayor asked whether subsection 
(h) of the statute23 would suggest that the act of making a hiring decision based 
on the examination constituted a violation under Title VII: “So why don't we 
look at subsection (h) . . . . ‘it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to give and’—conjunctive—‘and act upon the results.’ . . . So when 
you hire, aren't you acting upon the results?”24 Because the language of 
subsection (h) includes within the definition of an unlawful employment 
practice the act of giving a test and acting upon the results, that appears to 
imply that any employment decision based on the examination here would be a 
triggering event for the statute of limitations. Justice Sotomayor’s inquiry is 
thus a traditional textual question. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21. Id. at 214-15.  
22. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205 (2010) (No. 08-
974).  
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006). This statute immunizes bona fide merit tests from the reach 
of Title VII unless they discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. 
24. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Lewis, 560 U.S. 205 (No. 08-974). 
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Justice Sotomayor then expanded on a hypothetical proffered by Justice 
Stevens comparing the case with the seminal Griggs v. Duke Power Co.25 
decision, in which the defendant’s employment decisions were based on 
applicants having secured a high school diploma.26 In Griggs, the Court did not 
measure the statute of limitations against the date when plaintiffs were 
supposed to have received their diplomas. Justice Sotomayor pressed counsel 
for the respondent as to how the case was distinguishable.27 The questioning 
here suggests that Justice Sotomayor was trying to carefully square the facts 
with existing precedent within the confines of Title VII. She used this same 
approach to consider the topic of affirmative action in the Fisher case. 
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,28 petitioner Abigail Fisher, a 
Caucasian applicant to the University of Texas at Austin, sued the university 
for rejecting her application in an admissions process that considered race. 
Petitioner alleged that the consideration of race in admissions violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. While the principle of considering race as a favorable 
factor in a university’s admissions in efforts to achieve a more diverse student 
body was affirmed in both Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court 
emphasized that the particular admissions process at the university was still 
subject to judicial review: “Once the University has established that its goal of 
diversity is consistent with strict scrutiny, however, there must still be a further 
judicial determination that the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its 
implementation.”29 A court must also carefully analyze evidence of how the 
practice actually works. Ultimately, the Court held that both lower courts 
“confined the strict scrutiny in too narrow a way by deferring to the 
University’s good faith in its use of racial classifications and affirming the grant 
of summary judgment on that basis.”30 The Court remanded and held that the 
court of appeals must “assess whether the University offered sufficient 
evidence that would prove that its admissions program is narrowly tailored to 
obtain the educational benefits of diversity.”31  
Justice Sotomayor’s questions during oral argument indicate a strong 
concern with judicial adherence to precedent: “So you don’t want to overrule 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
26. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34-35, Lewis, 560 U.S. 205 (No. 08-974).  
27. Id. 
28. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
29. Id. at 2419-20.  
30. Id. at 2421. 
31. Id. at 2422. 
sotomayor’s supreme court race jurisprudence 
7 
	  
[Grutter]. You just want to gut it.”32 Here, Justice Sotomayor demonstrated 
concern that petitioner may be maneuvering to curtail or even overturn 
recently decided cases—certainly not bearing out Rush Limbaugh’s fear that 
Justice Sotomayor would conduct herself as an “anti-white reverse racist” if 
appointed to the Supreme Court. 
This same concern with adherence to precedent is also seemingly threaded 
through Justice Sotomayor’s oral argument questions regarding standing. 
Specifically, Justice Sotomayor asked petitioner to explain how petitioner 
would even have standing to pursue this challenge, given that Texas v. Lesage33 
established that “mere use of race is not cognizable injury sufficient for 
standing.”34 She continued to press counsel as to what relief petitioner was 
truly seeking, given that Fisher had already graduated.35 Sotomayor repeated 
these questions during petitioner’s rebuttal, asking if petitioner was simply 
seeking a refund for her $100 application fee.36 This questioning on the issue of 
standing effectively cast doubt on petitioner’s true intention in bringing the 
challenge, which may have been to upend the Court’s jurisprudence on 
affirmative action. 
Aside from her questions on standing, Justice Sotomayor also sought to 
clarify existing precedent, and particularly how to determine whether the 
university’s admissions process complied with Grutter. She asked petitioner 
whether the university’s study on minority students sufficiently demonstrated 
the need for diversity.37 She questioned whether demographics dictate “critical 
mass” for a minority group and asked how, exactly, one would determine 
critical mass without turning the admissions process into a quota system.38  
Justice Sotomayor similarly sought clarification from the respondent, 
asking when courts should “stop deferring to the university’s judgment that 
race is still necessary.”39 She reiterated that universities cannot set quotas and 
suggested that they instead conduct individualized determinations, noting that 
race would not be a decisive factor in this approach, given that no two 
applicants are identical.40  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32. Transcript of Oral Argument at 81, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345). 
33. 528 U.S. 18 (1999). 
34. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345).  
35. Id. at 5. 
36. Id. at 74.  
37. Id at 10-11.  
38. Id. at 14, 17-20.  
39. Id. at 49.  
40. Id. at 65-66. 
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Overall, Justice Sotomayor’s questioning did not carry a tone of racial 
intervention, except to the extent that she did not want to disturb existing 
precedent on affirmative action. This was reinforced by her decision to join the 
majority opinion in remanding the case for a more exacting review of the 
university’s admissions policy while leaving the precedents of Bakke, Gratz, and 
Grutter intact. In contrast, Justice Ginsburg wrote a critical dissent, giving great 
deference to the university and finding that its policy was consonant with the 
Harvard plan referenced in Bakke.41  
In Perry v. Perez,42 Justice Sotomayor joined the per curiam opinion on how 
Texas, a “covered jurisdiction” under section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act 
(VRA), was obligated to undergo preclearance by the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia before initiating any changes to voting laws. 
Texas submitted its new electoral plans for preclearance, and the court did not 
grant the state’s motion for summary judgment. Various plaintiffs brought suit 
in Texas, claiming that the new plans were unconstitutional and violated 
section 2 of the VRA because they diluted the voting strength of Latinos and 
African Americans, who accounted for three-quarters of Texas’s population 
growth since 2000.43 It was unlikely the new plans would be enacted in time 
for the 2012 Texas primaries, and the State’s previous district lines could not be 
utilized due to the inconsistency with population growth and the 
Constitution’s one-person, one-vote requirement. The district court devised 
interim plans, but Texas asked the Court to stay the interim plans pending an 
appeal, “arguing that they were unnecessarily inconsistent with the State’s 
enacted plans.”44 The Supreme Court noted that the primary duty of the State 
includes redistricting, and the failure to enact a new plan to gain preclearance 
before an election does not require a court to take up the state legislature’s 
responsibilities. Even if a census presents an “unwelcome obligation” of 
creating an interim plan, the plan in effect may give sufficient structure to the 
court’s endeavor.45 “To avoid being compelled to make such otherwise 
standardless decisions, a district court should take guidance from the State’s 
recently enacted plan in drafting an interim plan.”46 While the district court 
held that it had given effect to many of the State’s policy judgments, it also had 
a responsibility to follow neutral principles that advanced the collective public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2432 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
42. 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012). 
43. Id. at 940.  
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 941.  
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good.47 Ultimately here, the district court should not have cast aside the vital 
aid of a State’s recently enacted plan. The Supreme Court held that it was 
unclear whether the district court followed the appropriate standards in 
drawing interim maps for the state election. The Court vacated the orders 
implementing the maps suggested by the district court and remanded the case.  
During oral argument, Justice Sotomayor focused on the legal obligations 
to comply with the clear mandates of the VRA. She probed the appellants 
about the validity of asking for deference for their new map when it had not yet 
been pre-cleared.48 She suggested that it was an attempt to abridge section 5 of 
the VRA.49 She also asked how the district court erred in drawing an interim 
map, when the new map offered by the State of Texas was oddly shaped and 
rather gerrymandered.50 She pressed appellants to explain how the district 
court’s redrawing of the map violated the VRA or the Constitution.51 In sum, in 
Perry, Justice Sotomayor did not ask provocative questions based on themes of 
racial justice or injustice. Her primary focus was whether the district court 
exceeded its powers in drawing an interim map. 
This same approach—careful text-based parsing of statutes and precedents 
without seeking to overstep the traditional role of judges—can also account for 
Justice Sotomayor’s joining per curiam decisions in Batson juror challenges that 
allege bias in prosecutorial objections to particular black jurors. For instance, in 
Thaler v. Haynes,52 Anthony Haynes was tried for murder in a Texas state court 
where the prosecutor struck an African American juror from the juror pool. 
Respondent’s attorney made a successful Batson objection, and the prosecutor 
offered a race-neutral explanation based on the juror’s behavior during 
individual meetings. The prosecutor stated that the juror’s demeanor was 
“somewhat humorous,” not “serious,” and that he believed she “had a 
predisposition” and would lack neutrality.53 The judge stated that the 
prosecutor’s rationale was “race-neutral” and denied the Batson objection. After 
trial, respondent was convicted and sentenced to death, his application for state 
habeas relief was denied, and the district court denied his federal habeas 
petition. A Fifth Circuit panel granted a certificate of appealability with respect 
to respondent’s Batson objections and held that respondent was entitled to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47. Id. at 943. 
48. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Perry, 132 S. Ct. 934 (No. 11-713).  
49. Id. at 6.  
50. Id. at 19.  
51. Id. at 19-20. 
52. 559 U.S. 43 (2010). 
53. Id. at 45.  
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new trial. The Supreme Court stressed that respondent “cannot obtain federal 
habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) unless he can show that the decision 
of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ‘was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 
the Supreme Court.’”54 Specifically, “where the explanation for a peremptory 
challenge is based on a prospective juror’s demeanor, the judge should take 
into account, among other things, any observations of the juror that the judge 
was able to make during the voir dire.”55 The Court noted that Batson did not 
“hold that a demeanor-based explanation must be rejected if the judge did not 
observe . . . the juror’s demeanor.”56 The Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court and held that on remand, the “Court of Appeals may consider whether 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination may be overcome under 
the federal habeas statute’s standard for reviewing a state court’s resolution of 
questions of fact.”57  
Similarly, in Felkner v. Jackson, Jackson was convicted for various sexual 
offenses by a California jury and raised a Batson objection, claiming that “the 
prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to exclude black prospective jurors 
on account of their race.”58 The prosecutor presented a race-neutral explanation 
for striking each of the jurors. Jackson renewed the claim on appeal and argued 
that the prosecutor’s explanations were pretextual based on a comparative juror 
analysis. Jackson argued that the prosecutor asked the white jurors follow-up 
questions about their education, but struck one black juror without inquiring 
about her degree in social work. The California Court of Appeal upheld the 
trial court’s denial of the Batson motion and allotted “great deference to the 
trial court’s ability to recognize bona fide reasons” and distinguish them from 
pre-textual ones.59 When a respondent sought federal habeas relief, the district 
court noted that such relief “may not be granted unless the state court 
adjudication ‘resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding.’”60 The district court denied the petition, and the Ninth Circuit 
reversed, concluding without further elaboration that “[t]he prosecutor’s 
proffered race-neutral bases for peremptorily striking the two African-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54. Id. at 47.  
55. Id. at 48.  
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 49.  
58. 131 S. Ct. 1305, 1305 (2011).  
59. Id. at 1306-07.  
60. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2012)). 
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American jurors were not sufficient to counter the evidence of purposeful 
discrimination.”61 Finding the Ninth Circuit’s decision “as inexplicable as it is 
unexplained,” the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Batson issue 
turned on a credibility evaluation and that the trial court’s determination must 
be deferred to and sustained.62 “Here the trial court credited the prosecutor’s 
race-neutral explanations, and the California Court of Appeal carefully 
reviewed the record at some length in upholding the trial court’s findings.”63  
While the anonymity of a per curiam decision does not permit the public to 
distinguish the particular perspective of any single Justice, Thaler and Felkner 
both reflect Justice Sotomayor’s characteristic preference for upholding lower 
court decisions that evince reasonable applications of clearly established law. 
Indeed, even when Justice Sotomayor has chosen to dissent in a race-related 
case, her oral argument questions have revealed a primary concern with judicial 
adherence to statutory and case law precedents. 
i i .  sotomayor joining in dissent  
In University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v. Nassar,64 Naiel Nassar, a 
Muslim medical doctor of Middle Eastern descent, was hired as part of the 
University’s faculty and as a staff physician at the Parkland Memorial Hospital, 
which was affiliated with the school. Respondent argued that his superior, the 
University’s Chief of Infectious Disease Medicine, was biased against him 
because of his religion and ethnic heritage, that he was consequently forced to 
resign his faculty post, and that the University’s successful efforts to deny him 
a job with Parkland Memorial Hospital as a staff physician were in retaliation 
for his complaints. Respondent raised two Title VII claims: a status-based 
discrimination claim under section 2000e-2(a) and a retaliation claim under 
section 2000e-3(a). The district court found in his favor on both counts, and 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the retaliation claim but vacated the constructive 
discharge claim for insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court decided that a 
plaintiff making a retaliation claim under section 2000e-3(a) must establish 
that the alleged wrongful activity was a but-for cause of the unlawful 
retaliation by the employer.65 While the Court inferred a congressional intent 
to prohibit retaliation within broadly worded antidiscrimination statutes, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61. Jackson v. Felkner, 389 F. App’x 640, 641 (9th Cir. 2010). 
62. Felkner, 131 S. Ct. at 1307. 
63. Id. 
64. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
65. Id. at 2533. 
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Court noted that in this instance, such an inference was inappropriate. The 
Court concluded that “Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to 
traditional principles of but-for causation. . . . This requires proof that the 
unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged 
wrongful action or actions of the employer,”66 rather than the more plaintiff-
friendly motivating factor standard adopted in the lower court. The Supreme 
Court remanded the case for resolution by courts that were closer to the facts.67  
Justice Sotomayor joined the dissenting opinion, authored by Justice 
Ginsburg, which actually incorporated the issues that Justice Sotomayor raised 
during oral argument. Justice Sotomayor’s questions pertained solely to 
Supreme Court precedent, legislative intent, and legislative purpose. During 
oral argument, Justice Sotomayor challenged the petitioner’s argument that the 
Price-Waterhouse mixed-motive framework68 does not apply in the context of 
retaliation claims under Title VII.69 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title 
VII to permit the mixed-motive framework to be applied in employment 
discrimination cases. However, it did not specifically state that the same would 
apply for retaliation claims. Justice Sotomayor asked petitioner to consider 
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,70 which held that there was an 
implied retaliation cause of action under Title IX. Specifically, she asked 
whether the implied presumption of retaliation claims in federal discrimination 
statutes should command that the 1991 Act applies not just to employment 
discrimination claims but also to retaliation claims. The petitioner responded 
by arguing that Congress needed to directly speak to the issue of retaliation 
claims for it to include mixed-motive claims. Justice Sotomayor challenged the 
notion that Congress did not intend to include retaliation claims, asking the 
petitioner whether the legislative history weighed the negative consequences of 
extending mixed-motive treatment to retaliation cases.71 She argued that it was 
unlikely that Congress wanted to treat retaliation claims separately. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66. Id.  
67. Id. at 2534. 
68. This burden-shifting framework allows the plaintiff to bring an employment discrimination 
suit even if the employer had a legitimate reason for making an employment decision, 
provided that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for that 
decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
69. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 
(2013) (No. 12-484). 
70. 544 U.S. 167 (2005). 
71. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, 20, Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (No. 12-484). 
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In Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion, she too disapproves of the Court’s 
conclusion that Congress sought to treat employment discrimination claims 
separately from retaliation claims.72 Like Justice Sotomayor’s questions at oral 
argument, the dissenting opinion points to legislative history indicating that 
Congress saw both kinds of claims as an “unlawful employment practice.”73 
Similarly, the dissent repeatedly invokes Jackson for the notion that retaliation 
is a “form of intentional [status-based] discrimination.”74 In sum, Justice 
Sotomayor’s questioning at oral argument took an incisive look at Title VII, the 
legislative intent and purpose of the enactment of the 1991 Act, and the related 
precedents on discrimination cases. As such, though Sotomayor’s lines of 
questioning may happen to favor the argument made by a plaintiff of color, 
they are fundamentally motivated by a broad-based concern with proper 
statutory interpretation which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan all shared 
in the dissenting opinion.  
Similarly, in Vance v. Ball State University,75 Justice Sotomayor again 
approached the racial justice claim before the Court from a perspective rooted 
in traditional judicial concerns and not racially radical politics. As in Nassar, 
Justice Sotomayor’s concerns are not aberrant but are instead aligned with 
fellow dissenting Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. In Vance, the Court 
considered the question of who qualifies as a “supervisor” in a Title VII claim 
for workplace harassment. Because an employer’s liability may be contingent 
on the status of the harasser, the employer is liable if the supervisor’s 
harassment culminates in a tangible employment action. Vance, an African 
American worker for Dining Services at Ball State University, was promoted to 
full-time catering assistant. On several occasions, she complained of 
experiencing racial discrimination at the hands of a white employee, a woman 
who was not explicitly Vance’s superior. The duties of the employee were 
vigorously disputed. The Seventh Circuit explained that the employee had no 
supervisory status, but the Supreme Court rejected the “supervisor” definition 
in the EEOC guidelines.76 Noting that the term has various meanings in both 
law and colloquial use, the Supreme Court held that only if an employee is 
empowered to take tangible workplace actions against the alleged victim is he 
or she a supervisor for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII. Here, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2540-41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
73. Id. at 2539.  
74. Id. at 2542 (internal citations omitted).  
75. 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
76. Id. at 2443.  
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Court found no such empowerment of the employee and affirmed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the University. 
Justice Sotomayor joined the dissenting opinion authored by Justice 
Ginsburg. The dissent argued that the Court classified employees who control 
the daily schedules and assignments of others as falling outside of the 
supervisor category, “confining the category to those formally empowered to 
take tangible employment actions.”77 It further argued that the EEOC’s 
definition had a ring of truth with powerful persuasive force. “As a 
precondition to vicarious employer liability, the EEOC explained, the harassing 
supervisor must wield authority of sufficient magnitude to enable the 
harassment.”78 As such, the dissenting opinion incorporates Justice 
Sotomayor’s oral argument perspective that because the EEOC is charged with 
oversight of the implementation of Title VII, it should be afforded “more” 
deference.79  
In Shelby County v. Holder,80 Justice Sotomayor was again part of an entire 
“team” of dissenting Justices who would have preferred to preserve the 
judgment of Congress in reenacting the preclearance requirement of the VRA 
as a justifiable remedy for ongoing voter discrimination in certain jurisdictions. 
In the case, Shelby County, a covered jurisdiction under the VRA, sued the 
Attorney General in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
claiming that sections 4(b) and 5 of the VRA were facially unconstitutional. 
The County sought a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction against 
the enforcement of these provisions. Both the district court and the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence 
reauthorizing section 5 and the section 4(b) coverage formula. The Supreme 
Court held that the VRA, applying at the time to only nine states, departed 
from general notions of state sovereignty by suspending any changes to state 
election law until the changes were pre-cleared by federal authority. It noted 
the dramatic movement away from discriminatory devices used against 
minority races in voting eligibility since the VRA’s enactment. Congress 
reauthorized the VRA in 2006 even as it noted that “significant progress has 
been made in eliminating first generation barriers experienced by minority 
voters, including increased numbers of registered minority voters, minority 
voter turnout, and minority representation in Congress, State legislatures, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77. Id. at 2455 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
78. Id. at 2562.  
79. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Vance, 133 S. Ct. 2434 (No. 11-556).  
80. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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local elected offices.”81 The Court noted the forty-year national success in 
registering African American voters since the VRA’s enactment, and stressed 
that 2013 coverage was based on “decades-old data and eradicated [literacy 
testing] practices.”82 Ultimately, the Court held section 4(b) unconstitutional 
because “Congress did not use the record it compiled to shape a coverage 
formula grounded in current conditions.”83 Reliance on section 4 coverage was 
irrational and there was no reason to “insulate the coverage formula from 
review merely because it was previously enacted 40 years ago.”84 The Court 
issued no holding on section 5 itself, noting, “Congress may draft another 
formula based on current conditions.”85 
Justice Sotomayor was quite active during oral argument in the case and 
was highly critical of Shelby County’s facial challenge to the VRA’s 
preclearance requirement. Sotomayor noted that facial challenges are 
disfavored, and in any event, Alabama was rightly included among the states 
subject to preclearance—especially Shelby County, which she said was the 
“epitome of what caused the passage of this law to start with.”86 She criticized 
what she viewed as an audacious request on the part of Shelby County, which 
was to ask the Court to ignore the county’s own dubious record on voter 
discrimination and to “look at everybody else’s.”87 Justice Sotomayor explained 
that section 5 was intended to monitor and dismantle new forms of 
discriminatory practices that were being developed to disenfranchise voters.88 
She was not impressed with the equal footing doctrine, given that each state is 
different and has different needs.89  
While Justice Sotomayor was critical of Shelby County’s arguments, she 
did not add any controversial or inflammatory statements to the discussion. At 
most, she aimed to preserve the judgment of Congress in reenacting the 
preclearance requirement as a justifiable remedy for the continuing voter 
discrimination in certain jurisdictions. The most striking part of the 
questioning occurred when Justice Scalia labeled the preclearance requirement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81. 131 S. Ct. at 2625 (quoting § 2(b)(1), 120 Stat. 577). 
82. Id. at 2626-27.  
83. Id. at 2629. 
84. Id. at 2630.  
85. Id. at 2631.   
86. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-10, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (No. 12-
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a “racial entitlement.”90 During Shelby County’s rebuttal, Justice Sotomayor 
asked whether counsel believed that the right to vote was a racial entitlement, 
drawing attention to Scalia’s provocative remarks.91 After counsel’s obvious 
“no,” she asked whether Shelby County believed that racial discrimination in 
voting had come to an end, to which counsel replied that he simply believed 
that the formula in the statute was not appropriate in light of current 
conditions.92 Justice Sotomayor continued by questioning counsel on voting 
rights statistics for Shelby County and Alabama. 
Justice Ginsburg incorporated many of Justice Sotomayor’s concerns into 
her dissenting opinion. Justice Ginsburg surveyed the historical circumstances 
leading up to Congress’s determination in 2006 that the burdens imposed by 
the preclearance requirement were still justified by current needs in the 
reauthorization of the VRA.93 She then discussed the legislative record, which 
she argued the Court had blatantly overlooked.94 In addition, Justice Ginsburg 
discussed the new kinds of discrimination that continued to be identified and 
quashed by the preclearance requirement.95 Finally, she reasserted Justice 
Sotomayor’s argument that Shelby County was the wrong party to bring this 
suit: 
[T]he Court’s opinion in this case contains not a word explaining why 
Congress lacks the power to subject to preclearance the particular 
plaintiff that initiated this lawsuit—Shelby County, Alabama. The 
reason for the Court’s silence is apparent, for as applied to Shelby 
County, the VRA’s preclearance requirement is hardly contestable.96  
Given all the racial justice cases in which Justice Sotomayor is centrally 
situated as a “team player” in joining the opinions of her fellow Justices to 
support the strict adherence to stare decisis, it is especially pertinent to examine 
the one racial justice case in which she has taken on the role of authoring a 
dissenting opinion.  
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i i i .  sotomayor as author of opinions dissenting from 
denial  of  certiorari   
Buck v. Thaler97 stands out as the one race-related case in which Justice 
Sotomayor has been the principal author of an opinion. Yet even in the Buck 
dissent from the denial of certiorari, Justice Sotomayor does not speak alone, as 
Justice Kagan joins her dissent.  
The petition concerned “bizarre and objective testimony” from a “defense 
expert.”98 Petitioner was tried for capital murder and sentenced to death. A 
witness at the penalty phase of the capital trial testified that petitioner would 
not present a danger to society if given a noncapital sentence. The witness also 
added that members of petitioner’s race (African American) are more likely 
than the average person to commit a crime. If the prosecution had been 
responsible for presenting that testimony to the jury, the Supreme Court stated 
that this testimony would have provided a basis for reversal. When the defense 
counsel called the witness, he identified factors predictive of whether a person 
would constitute a continuing danger. With regard to race, he stated that 
“[i]t’s a sad commentary that minorities, Hispanics and black people, are over 
represented in the Criminal Justice System,” and this testimony was presented 
to the jury.99 The prosecutor asked the defense witness whether race increased 
the probability that petitioner would pose a future danger to society. While the 
witness’s “yes” answer was problematic, Justice Alito notes that the prosecutor 
“did not revisit the race-related testimony in closing or ask the jury to find 
future dangerousness based on Buck’s race.”100 Comparing this case with 
others where the witness had testified, it was the defense counsel who elicited 
the race-related testimony on direct examination. Therefore, it was the only 
case where the responsibility for eliciting offensive testimony was on the 
defense. Justice Alito’s statement denying certiorari suggests that this 
distinction justifies the lower court’s refusal to reopen the judgment of 
conviction.  
Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion opens by stating, “Today the Court 
denies review of a death sentence marred by racial overtones and a record 
compromised by misleading remarks and omissions made by the State of 
Texas.”101 Yet, as evocative as that opening sentence is, its conclusion is firmly 
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rooted in the State Attorney General’s own admissions regarding the past 
problematic introduction of race-elicited testimony from that same witness. 
Indeed, in five other capital cases where the very same expert witness testified 
regarding the presumed direct relationship between blackness and future 
dangerousness, the State confessed error and did not raise procedural defenses 
to the defendant’s federal habeas petitions. State prosecutors had elicited 
comparable testimony from the witness in other cases, but only in this case did 
the State assert a procedural bar. Thus Justice Sotomayor’s dissent states:  
What we do know is that the State justified its assertions of a 
procedural defense in the District Court based on statements and 
omissions that were misleading. . . . Whether the District Court would 
accord any weight to the State’s purported distinctions between Buck’s 
case and the others is a question, which that court should decide in the 
first instance, based on an unobscured record.102  
In short, while Buck stands out as a case in which Justice Sotomayor makes 
statements that are emphatic in their repudiation of racial stereotyping in 
capital jury trials, her dissenting opinion is actually very much in line with all 
the other race opinions which she has joined. Buck, like all the other opinions 
analyzed here, addresses concerns clearly raised by litigators and the relevant 
legal precedents. Justice Sotomayor directly discusses race in Buck because the 
State Attorney General himself raised race as an issue his prosecutors needed to 
address in connection with the same expert witness in the case. Justice 
Sotomayor’s objections are specific to the facts and defective procedures in the 
case before her.  
This fundamental concern with how racial stereotypes can adversely affect 
the administration of justice also helps explain why Justice Sotomayor took the 
time to offer an explanatory statement about the legal prohibition against 
racially biased prosecutions in Calhoun v. United States, despite joining in the 
Court’s unanimous denial of certiorari.103 Indeed, Justice Sotomayor opens her 
statement with the clarification, “I write to dispel any doubt whether the 
Court’s denial of certiorari should be understood to signal our tolerance of a 
federal prosecutor’s racially charged remark. It should not.”104 
Just as in the Buck case, Calhoun involved an allegation of a prosecution 
tainted by racism. In the Calhoun drug conspiracy trial, Calhoun denied having 
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any knowledge that the friend he had accompanied on a road trip had intended 
to purchase cocaine. In questioning the extent of Calhoun’s knowledge, the 
prosecutor asked, “You’ve got African-Americans, you’ve got Hispanics, you’ve 
got a bag full of money. Does that tell you—a light bulb doesn’t go off in your 
head and say, This is a drug deal?”105 While Justice Sotomayor notes that the 
U.S. Solicitor General himself conceded that the “prosecutor’s racial remark 
was unquestionably improper,” she joins in the Court’s denial of certiorari.106 
This is because Calhoun procedurally forfeited the argument that the 
prosecutor’s remarks should lead to automatic reversal as a violation of the 
Constitution’s prohibition against racially biased prosecutorial arguments 
when he failed to present the argument on appeal to the Fifth Circuit. Yet, 
because the prosecutor’s conduct was unquestionably problematic and a 
violation of professional ethical standards, Justice Sotomayor wrote a clarifying 
statement to the denial of certiorari that stated in relevant part: 
It is deeply disappointing to see a representative of the United States 
resort to this base tactic more than a decade into the 21st century. Such 
conduct diminishes the dignity of our criminal justice system and 
undermines respect for the rule of law. We expect the Government to 
seek justice, not to fan the flames of fear and prejudice. In discharging 
the duties of his office in this case, the Assistant United States Attorney 
for the Western District of Texas missed the mark. . . . I hope to never 
see a case like this again.107  
Thus, as has been consistent with Justice Sotomayor’s record as a jurist, her 
intervention in Calhoun was meticulous in its application of the legal standard 
of review and simultaneously exacting in her assessment of the proper 
administration of justice. While it is rare to see a Justice issue a statement to a 
denial of certiorari she agrees with, Justice Sotomayor’s articulated reasons for 
doing so in Calhoun are firmly rooted in an appropriate judicial concern with 
admonishing prosecutors who “attempt to substitute racial stereotype for 
evidence, and racial prejudice for reason.”108 In fact, Justice Breyer also chose to 
join Justice Sotomayor in this statement.  
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Justice Sotomayor, in cases pertaining to racial matters, has faithfully 
scrutinized the legal issues at hand without veering into the realm of racial 
commentary. Her reasoning comes in the form of classic statutory 
interpretation and adherence to existing precedent. Even where her views 
expressed at oral argument are within the minority of the Court, they tend to 
be fully adopted under the dissenting opinions of her fellow justices. 
Furthermore, when empirically compared with her fellow Justices, Justice 
Sotomayor’s oral argument questioning rarely expresses her own views on 
policy, let alone the “anti-whiteness” Rush Limbaugh feared.109 Instead, the 
vast majority of her questions concern narrow legal arguments.110 In short, a 
retrospective look on the occasion of this fifth-year anniversary shows that 
Sotomayor is the epitome of a careful and conscientious jurist, with a “fidelity 
to the law” in every sense of the word.  
 
Tanya Katerí Hernández is a Professor of Law at Fordham University School of 
Law and the author of Racial Subordination in Latin America: The Role of the 
State, Customary Law, and the New Civil Rights Response (2013). Copyright 
2014 Tanya Katerí Hernández.  
 
Preferred citation: Tanya Katerí Hernández, Sotomayor’s Supreme Court 
Race Jurisprudence: “Fidelity to the Law,” YALE L.J. FORUM (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/sotomayors-supreme-court-race-jurisprudence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109. Cynthia Kelly Conlon & Julie M. Karaba, May It Please the Court: Questions About Policy at 
Oral Argument, 8 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 89, 103 (2012). 
110. Id. 
